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Abstracts
The purpose of this research is to examine strategic incentives to distort the use of
pollution taxes on intermediate-good production in a successively oligopoly model where both
intermediate-good and ﬁnal-good trade exist. Since the rent capture e#ects of the pollution tax,
which depends on the trans-boundary externality(a), operate in opposite directions in the
upstream and downstream sectors, the non-cooperative pollution tax level can be stricter or
laxer than the cooperative tax level in accordance with the magnitude of the trans-boundary
externality(a). If a is relatively small (resp. large), then the non-cooperative pollution tax is
necessarily over-corrected (resp. under-corrected) in terms of world welfare. Moreover we
also investigate the e#ect of trade liberalization on the equilibrium pollution tax.
Keywords: vertically related market, pollution tax on the intermediate-good, trans-boundary
pollution, rent capture
JEL classiﬁcation: F12; Q56
I. Introduction
There has been a lively research discussion regarding the interaction between interna-
tional trade and environment. Considering negative externalities such as trans-boundary
pollutions, trade liberalization cannot always give rise to welfare-improving results, because
conventional gains from trade may be more than o#set by increased pollution from a trading
partner (Siebert, 1977; Baumol and Oates, 1988). Therefore, much of the popular opposition
to trade liberalization is based on fears about its consequences for the environment.
In addition to these arguments of economic impact of trade liberalization on environ-
ment, many other researchers have paid attention to the possible strategic distortions of
environmental policies for trade-related goals. According to the standard public ﬁnance
 The author is grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal and the discussants and participants at the
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the earlier drafts. In particular, the comments provided by the referee were very helpful in improving the paper.
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in production is a tax on the externality itself. And it is well known that the ﬁrst order
condition characterizing the market solution can be made to coincide with those for Pareto-
optimality by pricing the externality at a rate equal to the sum of marginal damages (so called
“Pigouvian tax”).
But if there are additional distortions such as imperfect competition in the global
economy other than externalities, the optimal tax on polluting production will be deviated
away from the standard Pigouvian level. In particular, when ﬁrms are competing with foreign
rivals in the imperfectly competitive market, each government would have an incentive to relax
their environmental taxes in order to gain a competitive position and to capture the rents from
their rivals. It should be noted however that more complicated issues arise with respect to rent
shifts when the taxes are levied on intermediate-good production in circumstances where ﬁrms
are competing in successively oligopolistic markets in open economies. This is because the rent
shift e#ects of environmental tax which are levied on intermediate-goods production could
operate in opposite directions in the upstream and downstream sectors.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the strategic incentives to distort the use of
pollution taxes on intermediate-goods production when markets are vertically related in the
presence of trade, not only in the intermediate-good but also in the ﬁnal-good. And we also
investigate the e#ects of trade liberalization on the equilibrium pollution tax. Here, the
strategic use of pollution tax means that the government imposes such a tax for reasons other
than encouraging domestic environmental levels, or that the government imposes pollution
taxes at the level more or less than the optimum in terms of world welfare. In order to
incorporate the strategic use of pollution tax on intermediate-good, we build a partial
equilibrium model which allows vertically related upstream and downstream markets with
imperfect competition, the tax choose game between competing countries, and trans-boundary
pollutions in the upstream sector.
A number of theoretical studies have been made on the use of environmental policy to
control the trade-related goal.
1 Of these, Markusen (1975a) and Baumol and Oates (1988)
show how tari#s can improve welfare by targeting foreign pollution. If tari#s are not available,
other instruments can be used as second best policies. Krutilla (1991) shows that net-exporting
(resp. net-importing) large country will set the optimal tax levels on pollution production
above (resp. under) the standard Pigouvian level due to terms of trade e#ects associated with
the tax. Ludema and Wooton (1994) analyze the incentives of an importing country to use the
trade policy to control foreign pollution. Using the asymmetric two countries model in which
externalitise is produced in ﬁxed proportion to output, they show that the speciﬁc tari# or the
pollution tax can be used to exploit monopoly power in trade. Copeland (1996) also examines
the incentive of trade policy when exists trans-boundary pollution, and shows that pollution
content tari#s applied to imports may be part of the optimal response for the importing
country. Kennedy (1994), which is most close to this study, examines the incentives of
distorting the pollution taxes in a single oligopolistic market when negative externalities such
as trans-boundary pollutions exist between countries.
The above studies conﬁne their attention to the single commodity market, therefore, they
1 Important papers are Markusen (1975a, 1975b), Baumol and Oates (1988), Merriﬁeld (1988), Krutilla
(1991), Ludema and Wooton (1994), Kennedy (1994), Copeland (1996).
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and ﬁnal-goods. Noting that, however, many environmental taxes are levied on intermediate-
good rather than ﬁnal-good (see Poterba and Rotemberg, 1995) and that industries at each
vertical stage may be imperfectly competitive, the appropriate set up for analyzing the strategic
e#ects of environmental policies for trade-related goals is one of successive or vertically related
oligopoly market model.
Since the 1990s, a considerable number of studies have been made on the strategic trade
policy with vertically related markets (Spencer and Jones, 1991, 1992; Bernhofen, 1997;
Ishikawa and Lee, 1997; Ishikawa and Spencer, 1999). These papers analyze various trade
policies in the context of vertically related markets with particular attention to the e#ects of
imperfect competition and vertical integration.
2
Although the analysis of strategic trade policies with vertically related markets has had
extensive development from the 1990s, so far only few studies have been made on the relation
between trade and environment using this model. Mccorriston and Sheldon (2005) analyze the
e#ectiveness of border-tax adjustment to compensate exporters for domestic environmental
taxes when the environmental taxes are imposed on intermediate-good. Adopting the concept
of “back-shifting e#ect” in the vertically related oligopoly market, which is similar to
backﬁring e#ect in Ishikawa and Lee (1997), they show that border-tax adjustment rules
currently allowed for in GATT/WTO are likely to be too low to maintain the competitiveness
of exporters. Unlike Mccorriston and Sheldon (2005) which focus on the imports of interme-
diate-goods, Poterba and Rotemberg (1995) deals with the taxation problem on the imports of
ﬁnal-goods in the context of a model with a vertical industry structure. They show that if there
is no joint production, an import tari# equal to the tax on the intermediate-good times the
amount of intermediate-good used in domestic production of the ﬁnal-good will raise the
marginal costs of domestic and foreign producers by the same amount.
3
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we outline a model of vertically
related market with oligopoly that will form the basis of the analysis. The industry equilibrium
in the vertically related markets is then derived in Section III. Section IV derives the e$cient
taxes as the solution to a cooperative problem. This serves as a benchmark against the
non-cooperative equilibrium taxes. In Section V, non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates are
derived and we discuss the implication they have by comparison with the benchmark. In
Section VI, we examine how trade liberalization in the upstream sector might a#ect the
non-cooperative pollution tax rate. And in Section VII, we summarize the main results of the
paper.
II. Model
Consider two identical countries: the home (domestic) country is denoted by H and the
foreign country is denoted by F. The model introduced here is a two-country successive
2 Chang and Kim (1989) and Skeath (1995) also consider the trade policy in vertically related markets but they
focus on the quality di#erentiation. Bernhofen (1995) analyze price dumping and anti-dumping duties in intermediate-
good in the context of a model with a vertical industry structure.
3 When there is joint production, however, they argue that intermediate-good intensity may not be a reliable
standard for choosing border-tax adjustments associated with domestic environmental taxes.
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industries are imperfect competitive. In the upstream stage, a homogenous intermediate-good
is produced, while in the downstream stage, a homogenous ﬁnal-good is produced. There are
n identical downstream ﬁrms and m identical upstream ﬁrms in each country. The numbers of
ﬁrms are given and constant. The ﬁnal-good markets are assumed to be integrated across the
two countries, therefore, they can be considered as a single market.
Final-good output by a typical ﬁrm in country I(IH, F) is denoted by qI, and the total
ﬁnal-good output in country I is QInqI. It is assumed that ﬁnal-good producers follow
Cournot behavior in the integrated market. Intermediate-good output by a typical ﬁrm in
country I is denoted by yI, therefore, the total intermediate-good output in country I is YI
myI. Intermediate-good output by a typical ﬁrm in country I, yI, is divided between the sales
to ﬁnal-good producers in home country, y
h















I. We assume that
ﬁrms in the upstream sector in both countries also follow Cournot behavior. Assuming that the
upstream sector is characterized by the segmented market model of trade, each upstream ﬁrm
perceives each country’s downstream sector as being separate from one another.
By appropriate choice of units, there is no loss of generality in assuming that just one unit
of the intermediate-good is required to produce one unit of the ﬁnal-good. Other costs of
producing the ﬁnal good are normalized to zero. For the ﬁnal-good producer, therefore, the
only cost to produce the ﬁnal-good is the cost of purchasing the intermediate-goods
Production of the intermediate-good in country I generates pollution, MIqYI, where q
stands for the amount of the pollution emission per unit of the intermediate-good in each
country. The pollution crosses the border and also harms the other country. Environmental
damages in country I are given by EIE(MIaMI), where a “I” subscript denotes the
other country. It is assumed that E
0a n dE
0. A fraction a[0, 1] of this pollution
a#ects the other country. The linear inverse demand function for the ﬁnal-good in the
integrated market is given by pab(XHXF), where p is the price of the ﬁnal-good and XI
is the consumption of this good in country I and obtained by XI(QHQF)/2. Although the
assumption of linear demand is restrictive, it leads to clear-cut results in the analysis.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the model incorporates three stages of decision. In
stage 0, each country’s government commits to the values of its pollution tax on intermediate-
good production. In stage 1, the upstream ﬁrms in each country commit to the quantities of the
intermediate-good supplied to country H and F on the basis of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In
stage 2, downstream ﬁrms set their supplies in the downstream markets on the basis of Cournot
competition taking the prices of the intermediate-good wH and wF as given.
III. Industry Equilibrium in the Vertically Related Markets
As is usual in these models, equilibrium at the downstream stage is derived ﬁrst and then
the upstream stage continues afterwards. In the second stage of the game the ﬁrms take the
intermediate-good prices as given and choose their proﬁt maximizing ﬁnal-good supplies. The









qIpwI0, IH, F.( 2 )
Assuming the linear demand function, the second order condition holds globally. Clearly
the second stage Nash equilibrium quantities are functions of intermediate-good prices and




, QInqI.( 3 )
Since ﬁnal-good producers in both countries do a Cournot-Nash competition in the
integrated downstream market, each ﬁrm’s optimal output is a#ected by the costs of its rival
ﬁrms located in the other country. Hence, the input price chosen in the ﬁrst stage will a#ect the






which shows that the ﬁnal-good price is a function of the average price of intermediate-good.
In equilibrium, from the assumption of identical countries, the intermediate-good prices are
equal in both countries, that is wHwFw. And in a perfectly competitive market in
downstream sectors (n), (4) would reduce to pw.
lemma 1: 1) The price of the ﬁnal-good is a positive function of the average intermediate
-good price (wHwF). 2) In the competitive market of the downstream sector, the equilibrium
price of ﬁnal-good equals the average of intermediate-good price, lim
n
pw.
Now considering the intermediate-good market, each ﬁrm makes a decision about how
much to produce for the home country sales (y
h
I) and how much for the foreign country sales
(y
f





I. Recall that one unit of the intermediate good is transformed into one unit of the ﬁnal









































































which is the inverse derived demand function for the intermediate-good in country H and F
respectively. From (5.1) and (5.2), the intermediate-good price in country I is a#ected not
only by the intermediate-good demand in country I but also by the demand in the other
country. And if downstream markets in both countries are perfectly competitive (n), the
derived demand functions for the intermediate-good become identical with the ﬁnal-good
2007] :FJ>A>7G>JB :CK>GDCB:CI6A I6M:H DC >CI:GB:9>6I:-<DD9 EGD9J8I>DC L=:C B6G@:IH ++1demand functions, and hence the home and foreign country’s upstream markets are integrated
and can be considered as a single market.
lemma 2: If downstream markets in both countries are perfectly competitive (n),
then the intermediate-good prices between home and foreign country become equivalent
regardless of market equilibrium, implying market integration in the upstream sector between
two countries.
Let’s deﬁne the pollution tax on intermediate-good production before solving the proﬁt
maximization of upstream ﬁrms. Let eI be country I’s pollution tax rate on an upstream ﬁrm’s
production of externality, such that the upstream ﬁrm that produces output level yI and emits
qyI of the externality must pay eIqyI in pollution taxes. Thus BI(keIq) is the marginal
production costs including pollution tax to a typical upstream ﬁrm in country I, where k is the
marginal manufacturing cost of the intermediate-good and assumed constant, and equivalent
between the two countries.
The upstream ﬁrms are assumed to play the Cournot-Nash game by selecting the
proﬁt-maximizing output levels, given its knowledge of how these output levels translate into
market prices in the second stage game. And each upstream ﬁrm in each country will pay tari#,
t, to an importing country’s government on every export unit of intermediate-good. Since
optimal trade policy is not the focus of this paper and one of our main interests is the e#ects
of trade liberalization (which is represented by a co-reduction in t) on the equilibrium decision
about the pollution taxes in both countries, we do not introduce the optimal decision of the
tari# levels into the model. In this context, we treat the tari# level t as a parameter and assume
same across the two countries. Pollution tax, thus, is the only policy instrument available in the
model.












The assumption of the constant marginal cost of the intermediate-good production
implies that an upstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximizing output choices are independent across
markets, which simpliﬁes the analysis. Cournot competition in intermediate-good production







































where (I, i)(H, h)o r( F, f).
Solving these ﬁrst order conditions simultaneously, we can obtain the sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium quantities for the intermediate and ﬁnal-good as functions of eH and eF.

























































The equilibrium prices of the intermediate-good and ﬁnal-good are obtained by substitut-












Furthermore, since the di#erence between domestic production and domestic consump-
tion of a good is reﬂected as net export of that good, the net exports of the intermediate-good









I)a n dQIXI represents the net exports of the intermediate and
ﬁnal-good, respectively. Equation (9)shows that YIQI is inversely related to the value in
BI(keIq) while QIXI is always zero and hence is independent from the value in BI.
lemma 3: A unilateral reduction (resp. augmentation) in the level of the pollution tax rate
on the intermediate-good production increases (resp. decreases) the net exports of the
intermediate-good but has no e#ects on the net exports of the ﬁnal-good.
These results are very straightforward. A unilateral augmentation in the pollution tax
rates on domestic intermediate-good production raises the upstream ﬁrms’ marginal costs. This
would lower the domestic upstream ﬁrms’ relative competitiveness against the foreign coun-
try’s upstream ﬁrms, reducing domestic net exports of the intermediate-good. In case of the
downstream sector, however, ﬁrms in both countries purchase the intermediate-good not only
from the home country but also from the foreign country. This implies that downstream ﬁrms,
whether they are located in the home country or not, are symmetrical with respect to
purchasing the intermediate-good. In this context, an unilateral change in the pollution tax in
2007] :FJ>A>7G>JB :CK>GDCB:CI6A I6M:H DC >CI:GB:9>6I:-<DD9 EGD9J8I>DC L=:C B6G@:IH ++3country I would give the same cost e#ects to downstream ﬁrms both in the home and foreign
country, and hence the relative competitiveness of each downstream ﬁrm would not be a#ected
by the tax in the upstream sector.
In order to examine the welfare implications of the policy choice in pollution taxes in the
following sections, we deﬁne country I’s welfare, denoted SWI, as the sum of the consumers’























IV. The Cooperative Equilibrium Taxes
In this section, we investigate the cooperative equilibrium as a benchmark in order to
compare the non-cooperative equilibrium. Here, non-cooperative means that each government
chooses the pollution tax to maximize its own welfare, while cooperative means that each
government chooses the tax level to maximize world welfare. Under the assumption of
symmetry between the two countries, the cooperative tax level on pollution, which is
Pareto-e$cient, is chosen to maximize the welfare of a representative country, given the
equilibrium behavior of the ﬁrms.
To begin with, let’s characterize the industry equilibrium in the cooperative regime. Since
all the upstream ﬁrms both in the home and foreign country face the same tax rates in this
regime, we omit the subscript “I” from the variables representing pollution tax rates (i.e., eI
eIe, BIBIB). Thus the industry equilibrium can be obtained by replacing BI and BI
with B in the equations from (8.1) to (8.7). Adopting the superscript “C” to denote the




























































I hold from the equations (11.1), (11.4) and (11.5), the social welfare of the
representative country in the cooperative regime, SW
C
I, can be written as the sum of the social



































 from the (11.4), SW
C
I also
is a function of B t
2
. In the cooperative regime of an identical two country model, eq and
t
2
have the same meaning in terms of world welfare. Hence we do not need to discriminate
between the pollution tax(e) and the import tari#(t) except that t is regarded as a parameter
while e is treated as the only available policy instrument in this model. If we di#erentiate (12)










in equation (11.4), then we get the


















The RHS in the second equation of (13) is the reduction of marginal environmental
damage and the LHS is the welfare cost of the reduced ﬁnal-good output associated with the
pollution tax on intermediate-good production. In a perfectly competitive market in both
upstream and downstream markets, in which ﬁnal-good price is equal to the tax-inclusive






has the same meaning with
eq in the cooperative regime, eq t
2
can be regarded as the price charged on the externality
itself. In the competitive case both in upstream and downstream markets, thus, the price
charged on externality equals to the marginal damage (i.e., Pigouvian rule holds).
We denote e* as the optimal pollution tax rate on the production of intermediate-good
when both countries cooperate to maximize world welfare. The cooperative equilibrium tax e*,
which is given by equation (13), is a function of t and a: i.e., e*e*(t, a). m and n are omitted
because they are not major focuses of this paper. Proposition 1 follows.
Proposition 1: The cooperative equilibrium in pollution tax imposed on the production of
intermediate-good is a negative function with respect to import tari#s on intermediate-



















Equation (14.1) implies that e* can be a substitute for t in a proportional rate under the
2007] :FJ>A>7G>JB :CK>GDCB:CI6A I6M:H DC >CI:GB:9>6I:-<DD9 EGD9J8I>DC L=:C B6G@:IH +,+cooperative regime. Equation (14.2) means that since as a rises the marginal environmental
damage also increases, therefore the equilibrium tax as the price on the negative externalities
also should be set at the higher level in the context of global welfare maximization. Next we
consider the game where each government chooses the rate of the pollution tax to maximize
its own welfare.
V. Non-cooperative Pollution Taxes and Comparison with
E$cient Pollution Taxes
In this section we examine the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pollution taxes in
which each government chooses its pollution tax level to maximize its own welfare given the
tax level of the other country. The governments in both countries will choose their tax rates
knowing that the choice of the tax rate will a#ect the equilibrium of upstream and downstream




IYIQI from (9), the social
welfare function in the non-cooperative regime, SW
N


















where the ﬁrst term of the RHS is the social surplus on domestic consumption, the second and
third term are the social surplus earned on net export of the ﬁnal-good and of the intermediate-
good, and the last term is domestic environment damage. Given the pollution tax rate of the
other country, we focus on the country I’s optimal tax rate. From (15), the ﬁrst-order

























































































0 hold from (8.5) and (9), and E
0 from the
concavity condition for the function E, the second-order condition is automatically satisﬁed.
Furthermore, in order to introduce the incentive of pollution tax in both countries, it is
assumed that the value of
(SWI
(eI
evaluated at eIeI0 is positive.
The ﬁrst order condition in (16) provides the usual reaction curve for country I on the
policy space of (eI, eI) given the other country’s choice in pollution tax. Considering the
assumption of two identical countries, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is given by the
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June +,,intersection of country I’s reaction curve with a 45 line. Solving equation (16) and eIeI
simultaneously, we obtain the non-cooperative equilibrium taxes on the intermediate-good








where superscript “N” denotes the non-cooperative equilibrium. The e#ect of a on e
N
I can be
















































4 Here, h represents the elas-
ticity of the slope of the environmental damages function E, and it necessarily holds h0 from




depends on the shape of E. From (19), we obtain the following proposition.






da is greater than zero. On the other hand, if E is not too convex





da is strictly negative.
Proposition 2 can be explained using the cross-partial derivative of country I’s social
welfare function, i.e., the derivative of its marginal welfare of pollution tax with respect to the













































0 from (8.3), the ﬁrst term of RHS is greater than
zero with h0 by multiplying E
q, while the second term is negative by multiplying the same
term. The degree of the trans-boundary (a) of the pollution has two welfare e#ects on country


























































0 for all a	[0, 1] from (8.3), the sign of W is
strictly negative, i.e., W0.
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country I, and hence raises the marginal environmental damage if E is convex in its argument.
In this case, the pollution taxes as the price charged on negative externalities would rise as a
increases. Second, it changes the pollution-shifting e#ect of the tax, which is represented by the
second term of (20). As we will see afterwards, a unilateral increase of pollution tax in the
home has an e#ect of diverting the associated pollution to the other country through the
decrease of intermediate-good production in the home country, and an increase of that in the
foreign country. If a increases, however, the diverted pollution will ﬂow back further to the
home, lowering the e#ectiveness of the pollution-shifting e#ect of the tax and hence reducing
the level of the pollution tax. And this second term does not depend on the convexity of
function E.
Therefore, the larger (resp. smaller) value of h implies that the former e#ect becomes
bigger (resp. smaller) relative to the latter e#ect, making the total net e#ect positive (resp.
negative). In an extreme case where h0( E is linear function), the ﬁrst term of RHS in (20)
vanishes and hence an increase in a would necessarily lower the level of non-cooperative
pollution tax.
Next, we compare the non-cooperative equilibrium with the cooperative equilibrium that
is already derived as a benchmark in Section IV. To do this, as in Kennedy (1994), we examine
each country’s unilateral incentive to deviate from the cooperative equilibrium taxes by
evaluating country I’s ﬁrst order condition, equation (16), at the cooperative equilibrium tax
rates(e*). We then decompose the overall incentive into four separate e#ects. In order to help
interpret equation (16) evaluated at e*, we subtract the ﬁrst order condition for cooperative











0, from the RHS of (16) evaluated at e*.A n d
considering that p





























































Consider each of the RHS terms of (21) in turn. As already suggested in Kennedy (1994),
the third term and the fourth term of the RHS capture the pollution-shifting e#ect (PSE) and
the trans-boundary externality e#ect (TBE), respectively. And since the PSE is greater than
zero, it tends to positively distort the equilibrium tax rates from their cooperative level for
a1, while the TBE, of which sign is clearly less than zero for any values in a, distorts
negatively.
As for the PSE, a unilateral increase in the pollution tax rates has an e#ect of shifting the
associated pollution to the other country through the decrease of intermediate-good produc-
tion in the domestic country and an increase of the production in the foreign country. If the
domestic government maximizes its own welfare, it does not take into consideration the
environmental damage experienced by the foreign citizens. In this context, each country has an
incentive to set their tax rates higher at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than at the
cooperative equilibrium.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June +,.And the larger value in a implies that the PSE becomes weaker. If pollution is perfectly






























































which is strictly negative only if h1 2a
(1a)
. We assume for the remainder of the paper
that h1t om a k e
dPSE
da












0. If each government maximizes its own welfare, it does not take into considera-
tion the e#ect of the pollution created within its boundaries on the environment of the other
country. In this context regarding TBE, the pollution tax rate that is set non-cooperatively is
lower than the cooperative level. If a0 then this term vanishes. The larger value of a,t h e





























































From the above discussion, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 3: 1) PSE is greater than zero for a[0, 1], and
dPSE
da
0. And PSE is
strongest when a0, and PSE0 when a1. TBE is less than zero for a[0, 1], and
dTBE
da
0. And TBE0 when a0, and negatively strongest when a0. 2) PSETBE is






. If either a 1
2
or m	 holds, therefore, PSETBE0.
Figure 1 describes the relation of PSE, TBE, and PSETBE with a for the case of E

2007] :FJ>A>7G>JB :CK>GDCB:CI6A I6M:H DC >CI:GB:9>6I:-<DD9 EGD9J8I>DC L=:C B6G@:IH +,/0. PSE dominates TBE when a is relatively small (i.e., a[0, a ˆ ]), however, TBE dominates
PSE when a is relatively large (i.e., a[a ˆ , 1]).
Next consider the ﬁrst and second terms of RHS in (21). These terms represent the rent
captured from the production of the ﬁnal-good (i.e., Downstream Rent Capture E#ect:
DRCE) and that from the net export of the intermediate-good (i.e., Upstream Rent Capture
E#ect: URCE), respectively. In the vertically related markets, the pollution tax on intermedi-
ate-good production raises the intermediate ﬁrms’ costs, which subsequently raises the down-
stream ﬁrms’ costs due to the price of the intermediate-good. And in circumstances of
imperfect competition, this would a#ect the rents in those markets.
First, as for the URCE, it is clearly negative and hence tends to negatively distort the
non-cooperative equilibrium tax rates from their cooperative equilibrium level. This can be
explained as follows.
As can be seen in lemma 3, since a unilateral reduction in the pollution tax rate on the
intermediate-good production has an e#ect in increasing the net exports of this good, the
domestic government can capture the rent in the intermediate-good market from foreigners by
reducing the pollution tax when market is imperfectly competitive. And if the domestic
government maximizes its own welfare, it does not take into consideration the proﬁt loss of the
rival country’s ﬁrm. Thus, a reduction in the level of the pollution tax on intermediate-good
production decreases the proﬁt of the foreign upstream ﬁrms, and the domestic pollution tax
rate that is set non-cooperatively is lower than the cooperative level.
In this context both countries reduce pollution taxes in an attempt to exploit monopoly
power in trade. However, it is worth noting that no rents are actually captured in equilibrium
because two countries act symmetrically in this model. This suggests that the distortions are
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, and 2XIQIQI, the DRCE can be rewritten as




















































































We assume in this model that a typical upstream ﬁrm supplies its products for the
downstream ﬁrms located not only in the home country but also in the foreign country. Under
such circumstances, for example, a unilateral increase in the domestic pollution tax on the
intermediate-good production raises the domestic upstream ﬁrms’ costs, which subsequently
raises not only domestic but also foreign downstream ﬁrms’ costs due to the price of the
intermediate-good. Thus although an increase in the domestic pollution tax would have a
direct e#ect of decreasing the domestic ﬁnal-good production, at the same time it would have
an indirect e#ect which would o#set such a decrease in the domestic ﬁnal-good production
through raising the rival downstream ﬁrms’ costs located in the foreign country.
And since the domestic government maximizes its own welfare, it does not take into
consideration the decrease of ﬁnal-good production and proﬁt losses of the foreign down-
stream ﬁrms. Rather, domestic government would have an incentive to use the pollution tax on
intermediate-good production as an instrument to raise the downstream ﬁrms’ costs in the rival
country when both countries behave non-cooperatively. Thus, the domestic pollution tax rate
that is set non-cooperatively is higher than the cooperative level. Considering that the two
countries act symmetrically in this model, raising rivals’ costs do not actually exist in
equilibrium.
The rent capture e#ect between the upstream and downstream sector operate in opposite
directions, but as we see below, URCE always dominates DRCE as far as intermediate-good


























And this result reconﬁrms the proposition in the Spencer and Jones (1992), where they derive
the necessary and su$cient conditions for the existence of intermediate-good export by a
vertically integrated ﬁrm to the rival ﬁrm in the downstream market. Spencer and Jones (1992)
show that a vertically integrated ﬁrm would have a tendency to restrict exports of the
intermediate-good to the rival downstream ﬁrms in the other country. This is because an
integrated ﬁrm may gain rents in the market for the ﬁnal-good (corresponds DRCE in this
paper) from raising its rivals’ costs even at some expense in the market for the intermediate-
good in the form of foregone rents form sales of that good (corresponds URCE). And a
vertically integrated ﬁrm engages in export of intermediate-good to its rival if and only if the
rents captured in the upstream market from net exports of intermediate-good dominates the
rents lost in the downstream market due to the weakened competitive edge in that market,
2007] :FJ>A>7G>JB :CK>GDCB:CI6A I6M:H DC >CI:GB:9>6I:-<DD9 EGD9J8I>DC L=:C B6G@:IH +,1when evaluated at the foreclosure price of intermediate-good.
6
If both countries impose prohibitively high tari#s on the imports of the intermediate-
good, then the trade of these goods are forced to zero between countries. We assume for the
remainder of the paper that tt
P, where t


























































































The above analysis about rent capture e#ect in upstream and downstream sectors is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: 1) The rent capture e#ect in the upstream (resp. downstream) by the
pollution tax on intermediate-good production is clearly negative (resp. positive) for a[0, 1]
and so tends to negatively (resp. positively) distort the equilibrium tax rates from their e$cient







0, where URCE has the negative value. 3) URCE domi-








As seen above, we have investigated each country’s unilateral incentive to deviate from
the cooperative level in the pollution tax when both countries choose their policy simultane-
ously. Out of these four e#ects, PSE and DRCE have the positive signs, while TBE and URCE
have negative ones, so the net e#ect of these four e#ects could potentially be either positive or
negative.
Next, we should examine the net results of these four e#ects. Considering (25) and (30),
the ﬁrst order condition (21) evaluated at the cooperative level of the pollution tax can be
transformed as follows:
7
6 But it should be noted that unlike Spencer and Jones (1992), which deals with the behavior of the vertically
integrated ﬁrm, we deal with separated or independent ﬁrms in the context of vertical connection. However
considering the government in this paper is concerned with the sum of URCE and DRCE and that the vertically
integrated ﬁrm in the Spencer and Jones (1992) model is concerned with the joint proﬁt of upstream and
downstream sector, the government in this paper plays the same role as the vertically integrated producer in the
Spencer and Jones (1992). Therefore it is not critical in the analysis whether the ﬁrm is vertically integrated or
not.




















































0 holds from lemma 2, the sign of equation (32) would be
coincident with the sign of the square bracket of RHS. Let’s deﬁne function F as the square
bracket of equation (32):




















0i fn and at0
(i.e., F(0; m, ,0 ) 0). Proposition 5 follows immediately from (33).
Proposition 5: If at0 under perfect competition in the upstream market, the non-
cooperative pollution tax level on the intermediate-good production coincides with the
cooperative level.
Next, consider the more general case where the assumptions in Proposition 5 do not hold.
Suppose neither n nor at0 holds. Evaluating F in (33) at a0 and 1 yields
F(0; m, n, t)pwt0, F(1; m, n, t)(wkt)0. Since
dF
da
0 holds from (23),
(24) and (31), there necessarily exists a unique value of a ˜that satisﬁes F(a ˜ ; m, n, t)0f o r
any values of parameters.
Proposition 6: Suppose neither n nor at0 holds. Then, there necessarily exists a
unique value of a ˜ (m, n, t) that satisﬁes F(a ˜ ; m, n, t)0 for any values of parameters. If a
a ˜ (resp. aa ˜ ), the non-cooperative pollution tax is necessarily over-corrected (resp. under-
corrected) in terms of world welfare. If aa ˜ , then the non-cooperative tax level coincides
with the cooperative level.
These results di#er in two key respects from those of Kennedy (1994), who deals with a
single market.
First, Kennedy suggests that the non-cooperative pollution tax is always laxer than the
cooperative level for any values in a that are not zero, hence there is no possibility of being
over-corrected in the pollution tax in terms of world welfare. In contrast, we show that the
non-cooperative pollution tax can be stricter, coincident or laxer than the cooperative level
according to the value in a, and specify those conditions.
Second, in Kennedy, the non-cooperative pollution tax is coincident with the social






































YIYI, we obtain (32).
2007] :FJ>A>7G>JB :CK>GDCB:CI6A I6M:H DC >CI:GB:9>6I:-<DD9 EGD9J8I>DC L=:C B6G@:IH +,3however, we show that the non-cooperative pollution tax can be coincident with the coopera-
tive level with at0 regardless of the market structure of the tax imposed industry (here,
upstream sector), only if the other vertically related market (here, downstream market) is
perfectly competitive. Moreover, we also show that even if a0 does not hold, there
necessarily exists a unique value of a (0) where the non-cooperative tax level coincides with
the cooperative level.
These results strongly depend on the nature of the model adopted here. In our vertically
related markets where both intermediate-good and ﬁnal-good trade exist in imperfectly
competitive environments, the rent capture e#ects of the pollution tax operate in opposite
directions in both vertically related markets: i.e., the negative rent capture e#ect in the
upstream market would be o#set by the positive rent capture e#ect in the downstream market.
In order to see this, suppose that the downstream market is perfectly competitive, thus there
F><.1 . T =: IC8:CI>K:H D; I=: SIG6I:<>8 UH: D; PDAAJI>DC T6M
DC I=: ICI:GB:9>6I:-<DD9 PGD9J8I>DC

























where the ﬁrst and second terms respectively represent the negative rent capture e#ect and
positive pollution shift e#ect with relation to shifted production of the intermediate-good due
to the pollution tax in the upstream market. And as can be seen in Kennedy (1994), the rent
capture e#ect dominates the pollution shift e#ect. Therefore, considering that the trans-
boundary externality e#ect (the third term of RHS in (34)) is less than zero, the overall net
e#ect in (34) is necessarily negative for all a that is not zero. In this context, the arguments in
Kennedy (1994) hold as one special limiting case in our model.
VI. The E#ect of Trade Liberalization
In this section, we examine how trade liberalization in the upstream might a#ect the
non-cooperative pollution tax on the intermediate-good production. Although we only discuss
import tari#s on goods in this model, we interpret a decrease in their levels in both countries
more broadly as a reduction in trade barriers. The e#ect of t on e
N
I can be obtained as follows




































in (35) is coincident
















































The second term of (36) that is positive represents the e#ect of trade liberalization on the
marginal social welfare of the pollution tax in terms of net exports in the intermediate-good.
Trade liberalization through a co-reduction of the import tari#s on the intermediate-good
decreases the price of the intermediate-good (i.e.,
(w
((t)
0). However, this raises the rent
per unit of the intermediate-good export (i.e.,
((wkt)
((t)
0), and ceteris paribus, it extends
the magnitude of the rent capture e#ect of the pollution tax, resulting in a decline of the
equilibrium pollution tax on intermediate-good production. This result conﬁrms the arguments
that trade liberalization may lead countries to reduce their environmental standards in an
attempt to gain a competitive edge over their trading partners.
The ﬁrst term, that is negative, captures the e#ect of trade liberalization on the marginal
2007] :FJ>A>7G>JB :CK>GDCB:CI6A I6M:H DC >CI:GB:9>6I:-<DD9 EGD9J8I>DC L=:C B6G@:IH +-+social welfare of pollution tax in terms of domestic consumption (or production) of the
ﬁnal-good. A co-reduction of the tari#s on the import of the intermediate-good reduces
downstream ﬁrms’ cost due to the price of the intermediate-good, which subsequently lowers
the price of the ﬁnal-good and hence the rent per unit of ﬁnal-good production (i.e.,
((pk)
((t)
0). This would abate the marginal welfare loss which is caused by the decrease in the
ﬁnal-good production due to the pollution tax. Consequently, a co-reduction of tari#s would
have an e#ect of raising the non-cooperative pollution tax in terms of domestic consumption
of the ﬁnal-good.
The third term represents the e#ect of trade liberalization on the marginal social welfare
of pollution tax in terms of environmental damage, and the sign of this term is less than zero.
Tari# reduction in both countries expands the production of the intermediate-good and in turn
raises the marginal social beneﬁt of the pollution tax as far as E
0. Therefore, it works to
raise the non-cooperative pollution tax on the intermediate-good production. From the above
analysis, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 7: Suppose E
0. Trade liberalization in terms of tari# reduction on
intermediate-good imports in both countries necessarily lowers the non- cooperative pollution
tax on intermediate-good production.
pf. Since the third term of RHS in (36) vanishes, if the absolute value of the second term











































































The trade liberalization in the upstream sector has a direct e#ect of reducing the pollution
tax on the intermediate-good production in an attempt to capture the competitiveness edge in
the upstream market, however, in the downstream sector, it has an indirect o#-setting e#ect of
raising the pollution tax. Since trade liberalization is applied to the trade of the intermediate-
good, it is straightforward that the direct e#ect which takes place in the upstream market
dominates the indirect e#ect which occurs in the downstream market.
When E





is ambiguous. Therefore, it can be potentially
either positive or negative, especially according to the shape of function E. If environmental





is likely to be negative,
because the third term of the e#ect on marginal environmental damages in (36) would be






to be positive, because the third term dominates the net e#ects of the ﬁrst and second term due
to the increasing marginal environmental damages.
VII. Conclusion
We have analyzed the strategic incentive to distort the use of pollution tax on the
intermediate-good production in the context of international oligopoly both in the upstream
and downstream sector. And we also have investigated the e#ect of trade liberalization on the
equilibrium pollution tax. The main results are as follows.
First, we have found that the non-cooperative pollution tax level can be stricter or laxer
than the cooperative pollution tax level in accordance with the magnitude of the trans-
boundary externality (a): i.e., there exists critical value a ˜ , such that for aa ˜ , the non-
cooperative pollution tax is necessarily over-corrected in terms of world welfare, while for
aa ˜ , on the contrary, the non-cooperative pollution tax is necessarily under-corrected.
Of particular importance is the fact that the pollution tax on the production of the
intermediate-good generates two conﬂicting e#ects with relation to rent capture e#ects: it gives
each government an incentive to negatively distort the e$cient pollution tax so as to capture
the rent from the increasing net exports of the intermediate-good, while giving an incentive to
positively distort the e$cient pollution tax in the downstream sector. Although the former
dominates the latter (therefore the sign of the net rent capture e#ect is still negative), the
magnitude of the net rent capture e#ect (RCE) of pollution tax is reduced by the o#setting
e#ect in the downstream sector. As a result, the pollution-shifting e#ect (PSE), by which the
non-cooperative pollution tax is positively distorted from the e$cient level, dominates the net
rent capture e#ect when it is relatively small, resulting in the over-correction of pollution tax
in terms of world welfare. However, as a rises, the PSE becomes weak. And thus the
trans-boundary externality e#ect and net RCE dominates the PSE, resulting in the under-
correction of pollution tax.
Second, it is related to the e#ect of trade liberalization. In the cooperative regime where
both countries choose the tax level to maximize world welfare, the pollution tax and import
tari# have the equivalent e#ect on welfare. This implies that the equilibrium pollution tax in
this regime would rise in response to the tari# co-reduction in both countries. However, in the
non-cooperative regime, each country would have an incentive to use the pollution tax
strategically from the viewpoint of maximizing one’s own welfare.
This suggests that the trade liberalization in the upstream sector has a direct e#ect of
reducing pollution tax on intermediate-good production in an attempt to capture the competi-
tiveness positions in the upstream market, which dominates the indirect o#setting e#ect of
raising the pollution tax that is induced in the downstream sector.
Thus if the marginal utility from the production of the externality is constant, trade
liberalization in terms of co-reduction of tari#s on intermediate-good imports would necessar-
ily lower the non-cooperative pollution tax. If the marginal disutility of pollution is su$ciently
increasing, however, trade liberalization would tend to raise the pollution tax due to the
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Third, it is related to the condition under which the level of the non- cooperative Nash
equilibrium pollution tax is equal to that of the e$cient pollution tax. In Kennedy, non-
cooperative pollution tax is coincident with the social optimum only when the relevant market
is perfectly competitive with a0. In our research, however, we show that non-cooperative
pollution tax can be coincident with the level in the cooperative regime with at0 regardless
of the market structure of the tax imposed industry (here, upstream sector), only if the other
vertically related industry (here, downstream sector) is perfectly competitive.
This result depends on the nature of the market structure that the upstream and
downstream sectors are vertically related to, and that the downstream sector is assumed to be
integrated between the two countries. From lemma 2, if ﬁnal-good markets in both countries
are perfectly competitive (n), then the prices charged for the intermediate-good become
identical between the home and foreign country regardless of market equilibrium, implying
market integration in the upstream sector. In this case where ﬁnal-good markets are perfectly
competitive, since both upstream and downstream markets are respectively integrated across
the two countries, the model considered here is coincident with that of the closed economy.
Thus the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium pollution tax would be same with the equilibrium
pollution tax in the cooperative regime where the equilibrium tax rates are chosen in terms of
world welfare maximization.
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